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CRIMINAL APPEALS
TECHNICALITY AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR
LESTER B. ORFiE *
A very common criticism of criminal appeals has been that ap-
pellate courts too often reverse a conviction on purely technical
considerations.' Appeal is said to offer one more loophole for the
criminal.2 A few have gone so far as to charge the appellate courts
with the major blame for inefficiency in the administration of the
criminal law. Judge Kavanagh has said: "The American Courts
of Review reflecting as they must the temper of the great body of the
American Bar, tower above the trials of criminal cases as impreg-
nable citadels of technicality."'
3
Technicality Against the Defendant
In the usual course of procedure criticism of technicality
in the Supreme Court is made by the prosecution. But even
defendants may now and then voice with justice the same
criticism. Most appellate courts deem themselves as not having
power to review the facts in the sense of hearing new evidence at
the hearing. Furthermore the appellate courts have frequently held
that the defendant's appeal must be dismissed because he has failed
to comply with the statutes or rules of court,' no matter how good
*Senior Attorney, Social Security Board, Washington, D. C., on leave Uni-
versity of Nebraska Law School
'Brewer, J., A Better Education the Great Need of the Profession (1895) 18
A. B. A. Rep. 441, 448; Charles F. Amidon, The Quest for Error and the Doing of
Justice (1906) 40 Am. L, Rev. 681 (1909) 34 Am. Bar. Assn. Rep. 578, 579; Charles
F. Bostwick, Proposed Reforms in Criminal Procedure (1911) 2 J. of Crim L. 216,
219; John W. Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions (1915) 9 Ill.
L. Rev. 529, 534; Charles K. Burdick, Suggestions for Reform in Criminal Procedure
Through State Action (1925) 50 A. B. A. Rep. 679, 687; Raymond Moley, Our Crim-
inal Courts (1930) 95; Paul M. Hebert, The Problem of Reversible Error in Louisi-
ana (1932) 6 Tul. L. Rev. 169; John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 211.
See the statement by Calvin L. Brown, J., State v. Nelson (1903) 91 Minn. 143.
2 W. F. Dodd, State Government (1928) 327; Report of the Committee on Im-
provement of Personnel in Criminal Law Enforcement (1933) 58 Rep. of A. B. A.
526.
' Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial
Power (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 217, 222.
4 In North Carolina during the years 1890-1927, 15.6 per cent of all appeals taken
were dismissed. C. R. Sherrill, Criminal Procedure in North Carolina (1930) 17.
Many of these cases, however, doubtless involved either frivolous appeals or
appeals by indigent dependents.
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an excuse he has. It is not to be doubted but that in some cases
appellate courts have too freely dismissed cases with the easy as-
sertion that since there is no common law right of appeal (in the
code sense) the appellant must comply literally with the statutes.5
More of the burden of complying with the rules should be borne
by the trial courts2e Appellate procedure should be simplified so
that an appellant is not likely to make mistakes of procedure. When
he does make them there should be ample provision for waiving
non-wilful errors and permitting the appellant to correct his error
and go on with the appeal.7 The standards of the bar must be im-
proved so that defense attorneys will know how to comply with
the procedural requirements. An expensive appellate procedure or
one not providing for assisting indigent defendants may make the
right of appeal an empty one.
Few Cases Appealed
In the writer's opinion, however, the critics of our appellate
courts would do well to remember that only a small proportion of
the cases tried in the lower courts are ever taken up to the appellate
courts. Of course a single appellate decision may lay down one or
more principles that affect vitally the handling of thousands of other
cases. The police, the prosecuting attorney and the trial court may
all be paralyzed by the action of the appellate court.8 If every case
taken up were reversed it would mean that only five or ten per cent
of the convictions were set aside. Indeed it has been increasingly
seen in recent years that most crimes are disposed of even before
reaching the trial court.' That is to say, the defendant is discharged
on preliminary examination, his case is dismissed or nolle prossed,
or he bargains with the prosecuting attorney to plead guilty to a
5 Barks v. State (1915) 11 Okla. 446, 157 Pac. 1055. In this case the appeal was
taken one day too late from a three year sentence to the state penitentiary. How-
ever, the defendant had six months in which to appeal. See the language of
State v. Leonard (1913) 250 Mo. 406, 408, 157 S. W. 305.
6 Keith Carter, The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (1913) 11 Tex. L. Rev.
455, 471.
7 This is the rule in England. See Criminal Appeal Rules (1908), Rule 45. In
Soviet Russia there are no prescribed rules as to the form of contents of appeal.
The appellant need merely say, "q wish to complain." The appellate court will
review even though an improper ground is set out. Judah Zelitch, Soviet Admin-
istration of Criminal Law (1931) 280.
8 John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 215.
9 Raymond Moley, Some Tendencies in Criminal Law Administration (1927) 42
Pol. Se. Quart. 497, 508; Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts (1930) XI; Alfred
Bettman, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on
Prosecution (1931) 10: Felix Frankfurter & J. M. Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1928 (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 44, note 27.
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lesser offense. If the major weakness does not lie in the trial courts,
even less blame can be assigned to the appellate courts.
Dangers of Statistical Conclusions
The proportion of reversals to affirmances is often pointed at
by critics of our system as indicating surely that the appellate
courts are overly technical. The matter is not as simple as that,
however. The number of reversals should also be compared with
the number of convictions.1" A large percentage of reversals may be
no reflection on the appellate courts when the number of appeals
taken is small. Hence in England where only six or seven per cent
of convictions are appealed a considerable proportion of reversals
to affirmances would have little significance. On the other hand,
if a large number of appeals is taken, as compared with the number
of convictions and there is an equal or greater ratio of reversals
to affirmances than in the former case, as in Texas or Oklahoma,
it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the appellate courts
have not acted on the merits. Unfortunately the number of con-
victions is often not available in a jurisdiction. 2 In jurisdiction
where appeal is of leave the fact that reversals run high will mean
little since supposedly the weaker cases have been weeded out. 13
Even where the proportion of appeals to convictions is high
and the proportion of reversals to appeals likewise not all the blame
is to be assigned to the members of the appellate court. The trial
judges may be incompetent and negligent. The standards of admis-
sion to the bar may be very low. The inpoverished intellectual
climate of the state involved may be an all-determining factor.
Technical Decisions in Fact on the Merits
In further defense of the appellate courts a decision is not neces-
sarily a technical one merely because it appears to be such. That
is to say, the appellate court may assign technical reasons for re-
versal where reasons on the merits exist. This is likely to occur
11 Grant Foreman, The Law's Delays (1914) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 100, 111.
12 England has long kept such statistics in yearly reports entitled Criminal
Statistics issued by the Home Office.
13 The failure to take this into account explains criticism of the English Court
of Criminal Appeals. See for example, William N. Gemmill, Procedure in Criminal
Courts (1912) 3 J. of Crim. L. 175, 178; William N. Gemmill, What Is Wrong With
the Administration of Our Criminal Laws (1914) 4 J. of Crim. L. 698.
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when the court is not permitted to review the facts.' It may occur
because the court wishes to dispose of the case quickly without
going through any elaborate reasoning process.15 Such decisions,
however, carry a number of evils in their train. They constitute
no contribution to the development of the law, in fact throw it into
a chaotic condition. And they may be vehicles for releasing de-
fendants out of improper motives of sympathy and charity rather
than justice.' 6
Functions of Appellate Court
Finally, it is worthy of observation that a review of the func-
technical decisions are not always so. One function of an appellate
court is to do justice in the individual case.1 7 An innocent defendant
ought to be released. On the other hand a guilty defendant should
not escape punishment. If this were the only function the appellate
court would merely have to ascertain whether or not the defendant
was guilty. If he was guilty the judgment would necessarily be
affirmed. It should be noted that the extreme technicality in earlier
decisions is explainable partly on the basis of doing justice to indi-
vidual defendants who were subject to the death penalty for very
slight offenses. Unfortunately this attitude of technicality continued
into modern times when penalties had been made more proportion-
ate to the offenses committed.28
But unfortunately other necessary functions of an appellate
court under existing legal systems prevent this simple solution of
appeals. The appellate court has the supervisory function of main-
taining the standards of the trial courts. If the trial court need only
concern itself with the guilt of defendants in one case it is likely
to do so in other cases. And if one trial court can adjudicate in
this fashion other trial courts may take the course of least resistance
14 "An appellate court may be denied the right of reviewing the merits of a
case, but a reading of the record convinces the judges that substantial injustice
has been done. A decision is handed down that looks as if technical considera-
tions are paramount, but really a substantial injustice is being remedied by a
technical gesture. It has never been hard for appellate courts to wear the lvery
of legalism in serving the substantial ends of justice." Raymond Moley, Our
Criminal Courts (1930) 104.
'5 F. N. Judson, The Judiciary and the People (1913) 219. Harlan F. Stone, J.,
has pointed out that a mere discussion of practice points does not mean that the
final result on the merits is always affected, but rather that too much time of
the court is spent in deciding them. Law and Its Administration (1915) 120.
16 John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 211.
17 "A court of -justice should be a temple-nor should justice be expelled
from the appellate, any more than from the trial courts." Seymour D. Thompson,
More Justice and Less Technicality (1889) Ga. Bar Assn. 107, 143.
18 John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 212.
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and follow suit. As a consequence in any jurisdiction there would
be everything from Cadi justice to justice with every legal safe-
guard. The weakness of such a system was demonstrated in the
first half of the nineteenth century in Georgia. It was one. of the
causes which brought about the creation of an appellate court in
that state. The Continental appellate courts exercise a marked de-
gree of supervision over the trial courts.
One of the modes of exercising such supervision is to reverse
the judgment below when a trial has not been conducted according
to the proper standards. Such reversal pulls up the trial judge as
sharply as perhaps could any action of the appellate court. It gives
the particular defendant another opportunity to be fairly tried. It
serves notice on all the trial courts within the jurisdiction that other
defendants must be fairly tried. Although the particular defendant
may clearly have been guilty he is to be tried all over again in
order that standards be maintained. That the judicial system must
permit this waste in order to serve a larger interest, is the theory.19
That some organ must perform this function is clear. That it must
necessarily be performed by the appellate courts is possibly open
to question and will be considered later.
A third function of the appellate court under existing legal
systems is to develop the law of the jurisdiction.20 It is not enough
that the defendant be an undesirable citizen. He must have com-
mitted some act which the law of the jurisdiction makes a crime.
He must have been accorded certain fundamental procedural safe-
guards. Inevitably the courts in deciding certain points of substan-
tive criminal law must lay down distinctions, which on first appear-
ance may seem technical. There is no automatic easily discernible
test of what is criminal and what is not criminal. But the line must
be drawn somewhere and who under our present legal system can
draw it better or interpret statutes better than the appellate courts?
Particularly was this true in the early days when the English com-
mon law was being adapted to American conditions." Today the
function is of far less importance and may be performed at least
in part by other bodies.
'9 Carter, C. J. (1921) Ill. State Bar Assn. 342, 344; (1922) 26 Law Notes 143;
Hewart, L. C. J. (1927) 12 Proc. Can. Bar Assn. 127, 131; Walter F. Dodd, The
Problems of Appellate Courts (1929) 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 681, 685; W. F. Dodd &
P. D. Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Practice (1929) 373; Paul M. Hebert, The Prob-
lem of Reversible Error in Louisiana (1932) 6 Tul. L. Rev. 169.
20 E. R. Sunderland, Note, Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases (1920) 19
Mich. L. Rev. 79.
21 Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City-A Summary, Criminal Jus-
tice in Cleveland, Part 7, p. 38.
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Similarly in deciding what procedural rights of a defendant
cannot be dispensed with it is inevitable that to some the appellate
decision will look over technical and over refined. The standard
may be accepted of reversing for violation of rules intended to se-
cure a fair trial as distinguished from rules intended for orderly
dispatch of business. 21 But ideas have differed and perhaps always
will differ as to what elements are necessary to a fair trial. Due
process has never been completely and exhaustively defined; neither
has a fair trial. This can be seen in such recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court as the Snyder Case where the court
divided five to four on the effect of a view by the jury without the
presence of the defendant.
2 3
Insistence of Certainty in the Law
This insistence is another cause of technicality. As in the law
of property and of contracts it is strongly urged that the lines be-
tween criminal and non-criminal conduct be sharply drawn so that
persons may know the consequences of their acts.2' This demand
for certainty means that the court in arriving at its decision must
consider not only the merits of the particular case but the effect of
the case on the body of the law.2 s There must be no slipping back
and forth between contrary rules. Human life or liberty is at stake
and it must not be trifled with. Hence the appellant presses every
possible precedent upon the court and the court feels that it cannot
get away from it. So far is this carried that even as the courts will
protect a man from prosecution under a statute making his act
criminal after his act was committed so they often protect him from
22 Report of Committee E of American institute of Criminal Law and Crim-
inology (1910) 1 J. of Crim. L. 584, 590.
23 Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1934) 54 Sup. Ct. 330, noted
(1934) 19 Corn. L. Quart. 477; (1934) 12 N. C. L. Rev. 267; (1934) 24 J. of Crim. Law
1102. Compare Powell v. State of Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55.
24 Francis B. Sayre, Crime and Punishment, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1929,
pp. 3, 5. Professor Arthur Goodhart objects that a criminal cannot be supposed
to have relied on the law. Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (1931)
55. He therefore assigns certainty as the ground of the rule. See also Arthur
Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law (1934) 50 L. Quart. Rev. 40;
W. S. Holdsworth, Case Law (1934) 50 L. Quart. Rev. 180; Arthur Goodhart, Case
Law: A Replication (1934) 50 L. Quart. Rev. 196.
25 Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 4 Lectures on Legal Topics,
145, 146, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 940. Pound says: "Indeed the necessity of weighing
not merely the grounds of the decision, but the exact words in which those
grounds are expressed with reference to their possible use in other cases and
thus of preserving within limits the potential analogical application thereof, is
perhaps the gravest of the burdens involved in the crowded dockets of modern
appellate courts."
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prosecution where there is a judicial change in the law.26 On the
other hand it has been asserted that when an act is malum in se,
an appellate court should never subsequently treat the act as non-
criminal while it might reverse a statutory construction where the
act is merely malum prohibitum.2 7 While such cases would obvi-
ously be rare in practice it is submitted that a court should in the
interests of humanity be permitted to reverse itself. The criminal
law has become largely statutory so that there is little field for
judicial development.2 8 Statutes are construed strictly although
about one-fourth of the state legislatures have expressly repudiated
the common law rule of strict construction.
28 a
In recent years there has been a considerable degree of
criticism of certainty as the great goal of the law. It has been
claimed that judges devote too much of their time to studying past
precedents and considering the effect of the decision of the parti-
cular case on the body of the law. 29 As a result the merits of the
particular case, it is asserted, are lost sight of. The free judicial
decision movement developed on the Continent emphasizes the just
solution of the particular case as the great desideratum. The Report
of the Illinois Crime Commission suggests that less attention be paid
to the rule of stare decisis; that theoretically the court should wait
for the legislature to change the rule, but that practically the court
should change the rules itself.
3 0
The decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals in England are
not absolutely binding on it as are the decisions of the House of
Lords. Professor Kenny, a leading English writer on criminal law
says: 31 "Indeed of all the forms of English judiciary law, whilst real
property law is the most stable, criminal law is the least so. 'Criminal
law,' says Sir Harry Poland, 'is an essentially fluctuating thing...
since our judges interpret it in accordance with the spirit of the age.:
For 'the static mind of the lawyer', as Sir Clifford Abbott puts it,
'must perforce come to terms with the dynamics of the biologist'; or
we may add, of the sociologist." The reversals, however, cited by
26 Note, Retroactive Effect of Judicial Change of Existing Law in Criminal
Proceedings (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 963.
27 Orrin N. Carter, C. J. Rule of stare decisis. 8 A. B. A. J. 51.
28 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America (1929) 209.
28a Note, Criminal Law and Procedure-Statutory Construction (1934) 32 Mich.
L. Rev. 976.
29 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City-A Summary, Criminal
Justice in Cleveland, Part 7. p. 38. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind
(1930) 153, 277. James M. Morton, Jr., Some Suggestions About First Instance
Courts of General Jurisdiction (1924) 49 A. B. A. 595, 605.
30 (1929) 19 J. of Crim. L., No. 4, Part II, 49, 55.
sI Outlines of Criminal Law (1926) 12tli ed., 501 note.
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Professor Kenny were on points of procedural law. His statement
more properly applies to the science of criminology than it does to
the rules of substantive or even procedural law.
If stare decisis is to be the guiding principle as to the substan-
tive criminal law, it by no means follows that the same rule should
apply to criminal procedure.3 2 No one could object very strenu-
ously to the act of the Missouri Supreme Court in overruling six
former decisions in which it was held fatal to the validity of an
indictment to leave out the word "the" before "State of Missouri".
Reversal for Nonprejudicial Error
Having considered some of the defenses of the disposition of
criminal appeals by the appellate courts with respect to technicality
let us now turn to some of their defects. One of the most serious has
been the attitude of reversing for any error as to evidence occurring
at the trial irrespective of whether or not such error was prejudicial.
This was not the historical attitude of the English appellate courts.33
It was introduced into England by a decision of Baron Parke in the
1830s.3 4 Fortunately it was uprooted there with the passage of the
Judicature Acts. But in the United States like so many judicial
doctrines long since abandoned in England it remained the prevalent
doctrine of the state and federal courts right up until recent times.
Lack of Power To Deal With and Dispose of Cases
Another defect has been one for which the judges are not them-
selves wholly responsible. They have been unable, or have thought
themselves unable, to dispose of the appeal as a whole. They have
regarded themselves as not having power to review the weight of
the evidence or to hear the defendant or the witnesses or to hear
evidence discovered after the trial. They have deemed themselves
limited to ordering a new trial even though the defendant was
clearly guilty of some other count charged in the indictment or of
some offense of which the defendant could have been convicted
under the indictment. As a consequence many cases where new
32 Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice
by Exercise of Judicial Power (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 217, 223.
33 1 Wigmore on Evidence (1915) 2nd ed., sec. 21. Wigmore says that the
Exchequer rule "has done more than any other rule of law to increase the delay
and expense of litigation, to encourage defiant criminality and oppression, and
to foster the spirit of litigious gamblng."
34 Goldwin Smith prepared the following epitaph for Baron Parke: 'ith
a powerful intellect, extensive learning, and most subtle acuteness, he cleverly
reduced the laws of England to an absurdity."
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trials are awarded are never tried. And in a considerable number
of cases there have been several appeals and new trials.
Technicality may in large part be eliminated by giving the
appellate court all the necessary power to deal with a case and the
employment of such power by the court. In the absence of an ex-
press contrary constitutional provision the courts should themselves
assume such power without waiting for a legislative or constitutional
grant thereof. They should be given the power to review the facts.
They should be permitted to re-examine the witnesses or the defend-
ant without being bound by formal rules of evidence. They should
have the power to hear new evidence discovered after the trial
below. They should exercise their power to examine errors not
raised below nor assigned on appeal where not to do so would work
injustice. They should have the power to correct an illegal sentence
or to direct the trial court to correct it. In the absence of a disposi-
tion tribunal they should have the power to decrease the sentence.
Furthermore they should have the power to increase the sentence
and that whether the appeal be from sentence or conviction. They
should have the power to alter the verdict within certain limits. That
is to say they should have the power to change the verdict to guilty
of some other count or part alleged in the indictment or to some
other degree of an offense charged in the indictment.
35
Suppose, however, that the indictment or information charged
the defendant with the robbery of a certain person at a certain place
at a certain time. It could scarcely be contended that the appellate
court might now consider whether this defendant committed rape
on a certain other person at another place and another time. To do
this would be turning the appellate court into another trial court.
It would deprive the defendant of his right to be formally accused
by information or indictment and to have a preliminary examina-
tion. Unless there was a full examination of witnesses he would be
deprived of his right to a trial itself. Even then he would be de-
prived of his right to trial by jury,38 since juries do not sit with
35 Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts (1930) 95, states this to be one of the
most frequently urged appellate reforms. Compare the English Criminal Appeal
Act, Sec. 5. The offense was reduced to a lesser degree by the Supreme Court
of Oregon in State v. Ragan (1928) 123 Ore. 521, 262 Pac. 954, noted in (1928) 7
Ore. L. Rev. 349. In State v. Sorrentino (1923) 31 Wyo. 129, 222 Pac. 420 the court
reduced a conviction for murder in the second degree to manslaughter, but gave
the state the option of a new trial or a reversal if it chose. The Minnesota Crime
Commission Report (1926-27) 35, recommends giving such power to the appellate
court, pointing out that existing practice calls for a new trial. See (1927) 11
Minn. L. Rev. 660.
36 Compare (1927) 36 Yale L. 3. 570.
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appellate courts.3 7 If he were examined against his will, his privilege
against self-incrimination would be violated. He could not be said
to have waived any of these by appealing since he was appealing
from a conviction of an entirely distinct crime.38 There seems no
good reason, however, why the appellate court should not have all
the powers of a trial court to accept a plea of guilty.
As to other crimes committed at the time and place the crime
charged in the accusation was committed an intermediate solution
might be worked out. The appellate court might give the defendant
this option: a finding of guilt and the imposition of a penalty by the
appellate court, or remanding the defendant to the lower court for
trial. The defendant could not then claim his constitutional rights
were taken from him and the need of another judicial proceeding
would be avoided.
The appellate court should be empowered to grant a new trial.3 9
The Court of Criminal Appeals in England has been criticized for
its lack of power to do so, and the court itself has expressed its own
regret at not being able to do so.40 The result of an inability to
order a new trial is that a defendant against whom substantial error
was committed goes free even though he may have been guilty of
the crime charged. It is somewhat to be doubted, however, whether
the lack of this power results in any great difference in practice. In
the United States where new trials can be ordered many cases are
never brought to trial again.4 ' The final outcome is much delayed.42
It is possible, too, that American courts are more prone to find
prejudicial error since the defendant can be tried again. On the
37 In the earlier days, however, some courts such as the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court sat with a jury. Thomas W. Powell, The Law of Appellate
Proceedings (1872) 345.
38 Frank E. Dunn, Delay in Courts of Review in Criminal Cases (1912) 2 J. of
Crim. L. 843, 848. Compare John W. Wigmore, Comment (1909) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 353.
39 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Pro-
cedure (1931) 44. In (1919) 19 Col. L. Rev. 503 is criticized State v. Ricks (1919)
32 Idaho 232, 180 Pac. 257, 13 A. L. R. 99, where the court refused to grant a new
trial though the appellant was unable to get a transcript up bdcause the reporter
had died. The court held it could grant a new trial only after a review.
40 Rex v. Dyson [1908] 2 K. B. 454. Some of the colonies which have copied
the act allow the appellate court to award a new trial. See Section 8 of Criminal
Appeal Act of 1912 of the New South Wales, Hamilton & Addison, Criminal Law
and Procedure New South Wales (3rd ed.) 527.
41 To Facilitate the Administration of Justice (1929) Ill. State Bar Assn. 269.
From 1917 to 1927 of 217 cases reversed and remanded only 67 were prosecuted
further. See Report of the Illinois Crime Commission (1929) 19 J. of Crim. L.,
No. 4, Part II, p. 49; Some Aspects of Appeals (1934) compiled by the New York
Law Society, p. 6.
42 In New York State the average time elapsing in civil dases between de-
cision on appeal and final outcome is nine months. Some Aspects of Appeals
(1934) published by the New York Law Society, p. 6.
LESTER B. ORFIELD
other hand in England since the defendant must go free if the case
is reversed it is not improbable that the Court of Criminal Appeal
is rather cautious before it finds that an error was prejudicial to a
defendant whom it regards as clearly guilty.
4 3
The power to order a new trial may be wise from another point
of view. It will help to maintain the standards of the trial court.
Of course an outright reversal without another trial is the most
emphatic possible repudiation of what happened below to the world
in general. But to have to retry the case may be more of a lesson
to trial courts themselves. One may ask, why not have the appellate
court retry the case itself and hold the appellant? There are a num-
ber of answers. If there were no reversal by the appellate court
not quite as much could be done to maintain trial court standards.
Something severe such as a reversal, whether with or without a new
trial, may be necessary to check the trial courts. Without such
possibilities it would not be clear that defendants are entitled to
fair trials below. The impression might easily get about that what
happens below is of little import since all errors may be corrected on
appeal. The trial of the case might come almost to be viewed as a
preliminary process. It has been suggested that instead of reversing
for error the appellate court decrease the sentence.44 This would
not dispose of the cases, however, where the appellate court found
error but could not conveniently inquire into the guilt of the de-
fendant. The American appellate courts as now constituted can-
not conveniently retry criminals; hence where there is substantial
error a new trial seems to be the only way out. It may also be
suggested that a severe rebuke of the trial judge is alone enough."
It is to be doubted, however, that this will have the same efficacious
result as a reversal.
The efficacy of reversals may of course be easily overrated. The
trial judges are not best where there are most reversals. In fact
too many reversals are likely to result in a feeling of futility and a
spirit of indifference in the trial of cases. Judges rarely intentionally
- Moreover in civil appeals where new trials can be granted they were
granted in only three and one-half per cent of the cases appealed during the
decade from 1890 to 1900. Amidon, The Quest for Error and the Doing of Justice
(1906) 40 Am. L. Rev. 681.
44National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on
Unfairness in Prosecution (1931) 345. One of the few cases where this was done
is Haynes v. State (1929) 45 Okla. Cr. 172, 284 Pac. 74. It has also been suggested
that where there is misconduct by the prosecuting attorney instead of reversing
he should be penalized. Carter, The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (1933) 11
Tex. L. Rev. 455, 473.
45 John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 208.
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commit error. If they do they ought to be removed for misconduct.
Far better than reversing is the removal of causes of error.
The granting of a new trial of course carries with it the (pos-
sibility of a second appeal and a second new trial." Thus theoreti-
cally a case might never be disposed of. This had led someone to
suggest that if a conviction be had on a third trial no further appeal
should lie.47 Perhaps it may seem purely arbitrary to stop at any
such point. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial no matter how
many trials are necessary. Instead of cutting down the number of
trials he may have, efforts should be made to improve the judicial
machinery so that only one trial is necessary. In England in civil
cases there was no second appeal for a period of over thirty years.
48
If the machinery cannot be improved so that only one or at the most
two trials are necessary, it seems an outrage toward an innocent or
even a guilty defendant to compel him to stand the cost and suspense
of more than one trial and appeal. There is much to be said for the
English rule of no new trial even though the defendant may be
guilty.
Reversal for Substantial Error
Reversal for substantial error is perhaps the most common mode
of attack on technicality in appellate court decisions has been sta-
tutes providing that cases be reversed only for substantial error.
Such statutes have been passed in many states 9 and Congress finally
passed a statute in 1919 after considerable agitation. The American
Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure provides:o
"No judgment shall be reversed or modified unless the appellate
court after an examination of all the appeal papers is of the opinion
that error was committed which injuriously affected the substantial
rights of the appellant. It shall be presumed that error injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the appellant."
46 In one case a defendant was found guilty five times. Five appeals were
taken, the first four resulting in a reversal. 'Neal, The Strange Case of Erwin
Pope (1922) 56 Am. L. Rev. 552. See the account of the King case (1883) 17 Am.
L. Rev. 607.
47 Judge A. J. Dittenhoefer of New York City (1913) 4 J. of Crim. L. 565, 567,
43 Charles F. Amidon, The Quest for Error and the Doing of Justice (1906)
40 Am. L. Rev. 681.
49 Eighteen states have abolished the rule by statute; nine or ten by judicial
decision. About twelve states cling to the old rule, E. R. Sunderland, The Prob-
lam of Appellate Review, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 126, 1466.
50 Section 461. This section is criticized by Sir William Brunyate, The Ameri-
can Draft Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930 (1933) 49 L. Quart. Rev. 192, 204.
He prefers the English rule which he states to be that before condoning an
irregularity of procedure the court should be able to satisfy itself affirmatively
that no substantial miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom. Wigmore says
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It is simple enough to pass such a statute. But it is by no means
easy to determine what is prejudicial error. Very likely no court
would regard such a statute as doing away with the constitutional
rights of the defendant, such as his right to a jury trial where he did
not waive it, even though no injury to the defendant was shown."
As to other errors committed, whether or not they will be regarded
as prejudicial will depend on the training and temperament of the
court. A court which worships precedent for its own sake is likely
to find almost any kind of error to be prejudicial, whereas a more
liberal court would easily pass over it.
It is further to be noted that even though the appellate court
falls in with the spirit of a statute providing against reversal except
for substantial error this does not prevent an appeal from being
taken merely to delay.52 To abolish such appeals the time it takes
to appeal must be cut down so far as to make them unprofitable,
and the court must have the power to penalize frivolous appeals.
Obviously then relief from technicality must not be hoped for
simply by the passage of statutes. Something much subtler is in-
volved. The attitude of the courts must be changed.5' The courts
must be persuaded to take an attitude midway between two ex-
tremes. They must not on the one hand apply the Exchequer rule
of reversing for all errors whether prejudicial or not. They must
not on the other hand affirm merely on a showing that the defendant
was guilty irrespective of how unfairly he was tried ' The latter
would seem almost to amount to judicial lynch law.55 The test
rather should be, did the defendant have a fair trial? If he did not,
the court should reverse and its reversal should not be regarded as
technical. As Mr. Justice Cardoz6 has said: "A criminal however
shocking his crime, is not to answer for it with forfeiture of life or
liberty till tried and convicted in conformity with law."'' 6 Rules of
there should be no reversal unless the error ought to have affected the verdict.
1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 21(3). That the court should consider
whether the jury was misled, and not whether it might have been is asserted
by R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process (1932)
42 Yale L. J. 194, 224.
"1 State v. Cluff (1916) 48 Utah 102, 158 Pac. 701.
52 Note, Penalties for Frivolous Appeals (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 113.
5"1 Wigmore on Evidence (1915) 2nd ed., sec. 21(3); E. R. Sunderland, The
Problem of Appellate Review, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 126, 146; Felix Frankfurter & Henry
M. Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1932 (1933) 47
Harv. L. Rev. 245, 281; John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 228.
54 John W. Wigmore seems almost to favor afirmances in such cases. Comment
(1909) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 353.
55 "Carried to its logical limits this view would seem to justify trial by mob
frenzy, provided only that the right man was hanged." William M. Cain, Note,
Error Without Prejudice Rule (1931) 6 Notre Dame Lawyer, 383.
58 People v. Nuran (1927) 246 N. Y. 100, 106, 158 N. E. 35.
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procedure intended solely for the orderly dispatch of business should
be distinguished from rules intended to secure a fair trial for the
accused.57 In the past too often the courts have failed to draw any
such distinction. 8
Trial of Cases by Apellate Judges
How can judges adopt such an attitude? One possibility is to
have appellate judges serve as trial judges as well." The judges
would then be confronted with the difficulties of trying cases and
would not expect the impossible of trial judges. As Dean Wigmore
has said, the present system has tended to make the appellate judge
"more and more of a legal monk, immured in a Carthusian cell and
cultivating his little plot of the law's barren logic." 60 The trial court
hears witnesses, it acts with a jury, it must act promptly, it has to
act under the excitement of a trial, and it has no opportunity to
study printed abstracts of all the evidence or briefs on the legal
issues. An appellate court if made up of judges without trial
experience either as lawyers or judges is likely to overlook these
things and technical decisions then emerge."
In the early American appellate courts the appellate and trial
functions were not sharply differentiated. 62 Even today some of the
New England appellate courts try certain types of civil cases. The
Court of Criminal Appeals in England is made up of the judges of
the King's Bench Division which spends more than half of its time
tryaing civil cases and only about forty days a year in hearing
criminal appeals. The trend in the United States has been towards
a sharp separation. There has even been agitation in recent years
in Massachusetts to remove what little nisi prius jurisdiction the
appellate court has left. The cause of this separation, however, has
67Report of Committee E of American Institute of Criminal Law and Crim-
inology (1910) 1 J. of Crim. L. 584, 590.
us "To a large extent they exist as bodies for the enforcement of all the
numerous details of procedure that have been developed to control the trial of
cases." Walter F. Dodd, State Government (1929) 320.
59 Moorfield Storey, President's Address (1915) 5th Ann. Rep. Mass. Bar Assn.
23, 35. See Walter F. Dodd, The Problems of Appellate Courts (1929) 6 Am. L.
Sch. Rev. 681, 685.
60 The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions (1915) 9 Ill. L. Rev. 529, 534.
61 Frank H. Hiscock, C. J., The Court of Appeals of New York: Some Features
of Its Organization and Work (1929) 14 Corn. L. Quart. 131, 134; 4 Works of Ben-
tham (1843) 351.
e2 During the years 1814 to 1852 the General Court made up of trial judges
was the highest criminal appellate court in Virginia. Francis H. McGuire, The
General Court of Virginia (1895) 8 Va. State Bar Assn. 222: Kean, Our Judicial
System: Some of Its History and Some of Its Defects (1889) 22 Va. Bar Assn. 139,
143.
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not been so much because it was thought that such jurisdictions
weakened the appellate work but because the appellate courts be-
came congested, and hence some functions had to be sloughed off.
Assigning trial work to the appellate courts seems impracticable
for two reasons. In the first place as has been seen, the appellate
courts already have too much work to do. More work would simply
swamp them. In the second place there is the possibility of what
amounts to judicial log-rolling..3 When a case tried by an appellate
judge came up on appeal the appellate court would be more re-
luctant to reverse out of respect for their colleague and also having
in mind that their own decisions might be reversed. The second
objection is not a strong one, however, and the amount of good done
by such a system would probably far outweigh any harm done in
occasional cases. The plan has worked well in England. Doubtless
one of the reasons that the English Court of Criminal Appeal is
superior to the Oklahoma 'and Texas criminal courts is that its
judges are trial judges, trying important civil cases as well.
Unified Court
It may be possible that the closest thing to a union of trial and
appellate functions are the various proposals for a unified court in
each jurisdiction. Under such a plan the chief justice of the state
or the judicial council or some similar authority would co-ordinate
the judicial organization of the state and judges from the appellate
court might be shifted to the trial court and judges from the trial
court to the appellate court. Appeals would become as simple as ap-
plications for a new trial or a rehearing.64 In view of the general
congestion of appellate courts the adoption of a unified court system
would, however, likely result merely in the calling in of trial judges
to aid the appellate court in disposing of its cases. It has been
argued in favor of a unified court that duplication and certification
of the records are then done away with since both the trial court
and appellate court are branches of the same court.6 5 However, it
63Twenty-One Years of Criminal Appeal (1929) 93 Justice of the Peace 200.
64 "The ideal of appellate procedure should be iot a separate proceedind
in a district tribunal but an application for rehearing, new trial, vacation or
modification, as the case may require, made in the same cause before another
branch of the same tribunal." Roscoe Pound, Canons of Procedural Reform
(1926) 51 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 290. See Charles T. McCormick, A Proposed Re-
organization of the Illinois Judiciary (1934) 29 IlL L. Rev. 31, 37.
65Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administra-
tion of Justice (1906) 29 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 395, 409; Pound, The Organization
of Courts, Bull. VI, American Judicature Society 1, 25 (1914).
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would seem simple enough to provide for sending up the original
records without any such unification.
Procedural Reform. a) By Statute
Many reversals are for slips in procedure.6 6 If it were
simpler fewer grounds for reversal would be presented. Such pro-
cedural changes may be brought about in either or both of two
ways: by statute or by rule of court. Past experience has indicated
that legislatures engage in tinkering, patching up small defects and
paying no attention to serious ones. Judiciary committees may have
no lawyers on them, or mediocre country lawyers, or city lawyers,
who may themselves have a criminal practice or for other reasons
disapprove of reform. Other legislative business is likely to crowd
out bills which serve no selfish interest. The American Law Insti-
tute Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1930 offers an invalu-
able model for legislatures. It is, however, far from perfect 6 7 Many
parts of it simply represent the prevalent rule in a majority of
jurisdictions without laying down what ought to be the rule. Other
parts represent merely a compromise-a step in the right direction
without going the whole way. Furthermore its adoption might in
some jurisdictions result in a static condition of the law as it might
be felt that no further changes could be necessary. Hence if it is to
be adopted it should preferably be by rules of court.68
b) By Rules of Court
This is a more promising method of obtaining reform in
procedure. Dean Pound and a number of others have been
urging such reform in civil cases for the last quarter of a
century. 9 It is only recently that it has been suggested that
this be done in the criminal law.70 The Supreme Court of
66 James W. Garner asserts that perhaps as much as a third of litigation has
to do with procedural error much of which is error in taking appeals. (1910)
1 J. of Crim. L. 469. In California more than four-fiftlhs of the reversals have
been for errors of procedure. Chester G. Vernier and Philip Selig, Jr., The Re-
versal of Criminal Cases in the Supreme Court of California (1929) 20 J. of- Crim.
L 60, 65. It is to be borne in mind, however, that an error with respect to in-
structions may be an error concerning rules of substantive law.
67 A criticism from an English viewpoint is that by Sir William Brunyate,
The American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930 (1933) 49 L. Quart. Rev. 192.
68 Report of Section on Criminal Law (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 558; Report of Com-
mittee to Examine and Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure Drafted by
the American Law Institute (1933) 58 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 520, 524.
69 (1909) 34 A. B. A. Rep. 578; Taft, The Delays of the Law (1908) 18 Yale
L. T. 28, 32; Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915Y
10 1M. L. Rev. 172; (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 651.
70 Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice
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Washington was one of the first to exercise the power.' The atten-
tion of the American Bar Association was drawn to it in 193372
Change by rule of court rather than by statutes has several advan-
tages. Statutes are passed by persons many of whom have no train-
ing in the law. Legislatures are usually in session only every two
years or every four years. Reform in judicial procedure is only one
item of their business and often a small one. Action by the legisla-
ture is likely to be spasmodic, so that a reform much needed may be
brought about very slowly if at all. On the other hand rules of court
are drawn by judges and lawyers with special qualifications. They
may be assembled at any time. Making rules together with the deci-
sion of cases and the administration of the judicial organization is the
chief business of the courts. Rules of court are flexible as they can
be changed whenever the need is felt. They would tend to dis-
courage reliance on technical questions of procedure to defeat sub-
stantive rights, since the courts would be more likely to interpret
the rules with a view to accomplishing the result for which they
were intended, namely, to facilitate the work of the courts.- Making
rules need not result in taking too much of the appellate court's
time since a judicial council or some similar group might draw them
for the court and submit them to it for approval.
It would seem that there is no phase of criminal procedure
which might better be dealt with by rules of court than appeals.
74
No phase of criminal procedure is perhaps as mystifying to the lay-
by Exercising of Judicial Power (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 217; Harley (1928) 14 A. B.
A. J. 621; Who Shall Control Criminal Procedure? (1930) 13 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 107;
Why Wait on Legislatures? (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 440: (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 765,
766; National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement; Report of Pro-
cedure 31, criticized by Justin Miller, The Report on Criminal Procedure (1932) 189
A. B. A. J. 453, 455.
71 It laid down the rule that where the accused does not testify there may
be an inference of guilt and also that there may be a tacit amendment of an
information to conform to the proof. Herbert Harley, Conference of Bar Asso-
ciation Delegates Has Record of Accomplishment (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 616, 621.
In 1929 the Superior Court of Connecticut adopted rules as to indictments and
informations.
72 Report of the Section on Criminal Law (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 558; Report of
Committee to Examine and Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure Drafted
by the American Law Institute (1933) 58 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 520, 524.
73 Walter F. Dodd, The Problems of Appellate Courts (1930) 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev.
681, 685.
74 Four per cent of American cases turn on points of appellate practice. Roscoe
Pound, The Etiquette of Justice (1908) Neb. State Bar Assn. 231, 242. Appellate
decisions in Missouri in over twenty per cent of the cases have involved either
in whole or in part the mere technique of obtaining a review. John D. Lawson,
Technicalities in Procedure, Civil and Criminal (1910) 1 J. of Crim. L. 63, 73.
The number of errors in appellate procedure has been increasing in Connecticut.
John K. Beach, Observations on Connecticut Procedure (1927) 1 Conn. Bar. J.
15, 18.
man as appeals. If an appellate court is to lay down rules of pro-
cedure certainly it ought to lay down rules as to proceedings before
itself. Congress by an act approved February 24, 1933, permitted
the Supreme Court of the United States to prescribe rules of prac-
tice and procedure as to federal appeals.7 - Such rules were adopted
on May 7, 1934.76 The California Judicial Council has established
rules governing the record on appeal in criminal cases.7 7  The Su-
perior Court of Connecticut in 1930 adopted rules of appellate
procedure.73 The Court of Criminal Appeals in England has the
power to prescribe rules. Procedure in general is determined by
rules in England.7 9 On June 19, 1934, President Roosevelt signed a
bill authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure for all federal courts.
7 9a
Discretionary Appeals
Making all appeals discretionary would produce the effect of
a strong tendency to do away with technicality. 0 The case would
then go before the appellate court only after a preliminary sifting.
The cases thus merging would have much more likelihood of having
some merit in them than the unselected mass of cases which now
come before the courts.
Selection of Appellate Judges
The mode of selection is likely to affect the quality of opin-
ions."' More important than either the procedure or the organization
of the court is its personnel. There is relatively little complaint ot
technicality with respect to the decisions of appointive courts such
as that of Massachusetts.8 2 Similarly in states like New York where
75 Public-No. 371-72d Congress, S. 4020.
76 Volume 291 U. S.-Number 3, Official Reports of the Supreme Court, Pre
liminary Print, Pages I to X.
77 (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 622.
78 Second Report of Judicial Council of Connecticut (1930). The First Report
of the Judicial Council of Connecticut (1929) 46. suggested that the Superior
Court lay down rules to govern indictments and informations.
79 See the discussion in Samuel Rosenbaum, The Rule Making Authority in
the English Supreme Court (1917).
70a See the discussion by Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making
Power to the Supreme Court of the United States (1934) 32 Michigan Law Review
1116.
80 R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process
(1932) 42 Yale L. J. 194, 224.
81 Roscoe Pound, The Work of the American Appellate Court (1926) 51 Am.
Bar Assn. Rep. 764. 772; Joseph R. Carroll (1920) 21 La. Bar Assn. Rep. 34, 42;
R. Pugh (1920) 21 La. Bar Assn. Rep. 74. 81. Orrin N. Carter, C. J., Methods of
Work in Courts of Review (1917) 12 Ill. L. Rev. 231.
82 For an attempted rating of the various state appellate courts see Rodney L.
Mott, Judicial Personnel, May, 1933, 167 Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Sc. 143. The judges
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in practice selection of the highest appellate judges is non-partisan
and based on a real effort to nominate able men the results are
excellent. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts doubtless owe much of their excellence to
the fact that the judges are appointed. On the other hand where
judges are selected on partisan tickets by popular vote with the bar
taking little interest it is not strange that the quality of judicial
opinions within the jurisdiction is not high.8 3 It is of course to be
borne in mind that the mode of selection is but a single and not the
most important factor bearing on technicality of decision.
Mode of Writing Opinion
This may result in technical decisions particularly where judges
attempt to write dissertations on points involved.84 Laying down
principles on points not raised nor argued may embarrass the court
at some future date. Judges do not have the time nor the training
to expound the law in general.8 5 When they decide points not argued
by counsel they are likely to overlook important considerations."8
This gap should perhaps be filled in by the creation of a ministry
of justice.
The Trial Court. a) Lack of Power
Reversal for technical reasons is perhaps more the fault of the
trial court judges than of the appellate judges. This is true for two
reasons. In the first place the trial courts are shorn of the authority
necessary to try cases in the most effective manner. The trial judge
of most American jurisdictions is little more than an umpire with
the real management of the case in the hands of the attorneys.87
are rated in the following order of excellence: United States Supreme Court,
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, Federal District Courts and State Appellate
Courts. See also the rating by Wigmore in the April, 1936, issue of the American
Bar Association Journal XX:227.
s For an excellent description of the usual type of state appellate judge see
Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions (1915) 9 Ill. L. Rev. 529.
84 "One of the former Justices of this Court, George Ramsey, came to this
Court with the avowed purpose of setting an example of brevity. (This he de-
cries.) Brevity he said was the pride of his life. Then he wrote Pettis v. Johnston,
78 Okla. 277 (here he demands strict proof), with its 34 paragraph syllabus and
its twenty page treatise on collateral attack and extrinsic evidence. So that now
every lawyer upon every side of every question finds comfort in the remarkable
text of Ramsey's work." Fletcher Riley, A Long Appeal for Brevity (1932) 3 Okla.
State Bar J. 116. See also William L. Carpenter, Courts of Last Resort (1910)
19 Yale L. J. 280, 290.
85 Compare the view of John S. Dawson, J., Rationale of Appellate Review
(1926) 51 Am. Bar Assn. Rep. 778, 782.
86 One of the few contrary opinions is that of Dean John W. Wigmore (1921)
16 Ill. L. Rev. 247.87 Roscoe Pound, The American Attitude Towards the Trial Judge (1928) 2
Dak. L. Rev. 5; John B. Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 199.
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Days may be spent in the selection of a jury as compared with a
few minutes in England. Technical objections to the admission or
exclusion of evidence are constantly presented to the court. In-
numerable and contradictory instructions may be asked. The court
in most jurisdictions is not permitted to comment on the evidence or
testimony of the witnesses. The jury is given too much and the trial
judge too little power. The jury may not only decide issues of fact
but issues of law and apply what it deems to be the law to the facts,
since the whole matter is lumped together in the shape of a general
verdict. To offset this weakness of the trial court in relation to the
jury, the appellate courts, as Dean Green has so interestingly
pointed out, assumed to themselves an ever increasing degree of
control.8 8 But this control comes too late in the judicial process.
The control should be exercised in the trial process so as to avoid
the waste and delay of an additional judicial process. A strong trial
court eyercising real authority over the jury and respected by the
lawyers can reduce the need for appeals and simplify the appellate
process.8 9 The trial court should not be so far behind the appellate
court.90 To some extent the appellate courts themselves are to
blame. A courageous appellate court might itself prescribe rules of
trial procedure and treat legislative restrictions as unconstitutional
interference with inherent judicial power. An enlightened bar is a
necessary prerequisite to so wide a departure from existing practice.
b) Selection
Merely to confer additional powers of any sort on trial judges
is not to usher in the millenium, however. The judges must be of a
kind which deserve to have such powers."' The present opposition
among lawyers in many states against allowing the trial judge to
comment on the evidence may be justified to the extent that poor
trial judges are chosen. Too often at the present time judges are
selected not for judicial ability and temperament but because they
know how to advertise themselves. The ordinary voter cannot dis-
tinguish between a good and a poor candidate. If by chance a good
,8sJury Trial and the Appellate Court (1930) Ill. Bar Assn. Rep. 261, 267;
Judge and Jury (1930) 375, 380.
89 Moorfield Storey, President's Address (1915) 5 Assn. Rep. Mass. Bar Assn.
23, 31.
9o Roscoe Pound, The Judicial Office in America (1929) 41 Va. State Bar Assn.
406, 417; James G. Gantt, J., The Nisi Prius Judge in Our Judicial System (1902)
15 Va. Bar Assn. Proc. 169, 171: Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014, 1037.
91 Note, Reversals in Illinois Criminal Cases (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 566; E. R.
Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review (1927)5 Tex. L. Rev. 126, 127.
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candidate is elected he soon has to begin to think about being re-
elected. Appointment by the executive or by the executive together
with an advisory group such as a judicial council, for a period
limited only by good behavior, seems essential if better judges are
to be obtained.
c) Supervision
Now having conferred the requisite degree of authority on
trial judges and provided for a proper mode of selection little re-
mains to be done except to provide for their supervision. This can
perhaps best be accomplished through a unified court system. If a
unified court for the whole state cannot be obtained it may still be
feasible to get one in large metropolitan centers.9 2 The judicial per-
sonnel can then be employed so that the more important criminal
cases will be tried by skilled trial judges who know how to avoid
prejudicial error. The "superintending control" given in some states
to the appellate courts may be made the basis of a certain amount of
supervision.9 3 Under this power appellate courts have compelled
a change of venue and ordered an inferior court to go on with a
criminal proceeding when it has wrongfully quashed a complaint.
The development of an adequate plan of supervision will do much
to eliminate the need of reversing to secure uniformity of standards.
Waiver of Jury Trial. a) Instructions
Provision for waiver would do much to eliminate technical re-
versals. Statistics indicate that most reversals are for errors in in-
structions to the jury or in admission or exclusion of evidence.9 Jury
trials have been assigned the chief blame for the necessity of appeals,
new trials, and a host of other evils94 a Where there is no jury trial
there are of course no instructions as the court itself passes on the
facts. Theoretically the function of instructions is to enlighten the
jury on the law. But in practice the charge to the jury has been a
favorite trap of the defendant and a convenient vehicle for the
92 Herbert Harley, The Need for a Criminal Court (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 567.
93 (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 755; 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 942; Lowe v. District Court,
(1921) 48 N. D. 1, 181 N. W. 92.
94 Joseph Green and Thomas J. Connors, Causes for Reversals of Cook County
Convictions 1924-1928 (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 100; Missouri Crime Survey (1926) 223;
Keith Carter, The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (1933) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 185,
198. Chester G. Vernier and Philip Selig, Jr., The Reversal of Criminal Cases in
the Supreme Court of California (1929) 20 J. of Crim. L. 60, 65; G. A. Sherrill,
Criminal Procedure in North Carolina (1930) 67.
94a"The difficulties of evidence, instructions, new trials, appellate review, and
the abuses which arise from crowded dockets, excessive costs, unethical practices,
and most of the other troublesome incidents of the judicial process result primarily
from jury trial." Leon Green, Judge and Jury (1930) 375.
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appellate court's exercising control over the trial court 5 It is not
hard to demonstrate that a technically perfect instruction is almost
impossible, hence a reversal may be made to depend on the dis-
cretion of the appellate court. A trial court presented with a mass
of confusing and contradictory instructions by the lawyers on both
sides, with little time to ponder over them, can hardly be blamed
if it falls into error. If a jury is used the trial court should not be
confined to giving only the instructions asked for as it is in Missis-
sippiY6 The federal rule of discretion in the trial court seems prefer-
able. Instructions should be simple.9 7 Prejudicial errors may in
large part be avoided by the giving of cautionary instructions. Since
the appellate courts developed the rules of misdirection for their
own benefit, they should employ them for their own benefit, too,
and not reverse for mere technical error.
b) Evidence
The other serious defect many times associated with jury
trials is the large proportion of reversals for errors in admitting or
excluding evidence.98 Any student of the law of evidence knows
that many of its rules developed as they did because cases were
tried by a judge and a jury and not by a judge alone. Where cases
are tried in our courts today without a jury, lawyers raise relatively
few objections to evidence. If there is any uncertainty the judge
hears the evidence and states that if it appears to be inadmissible
he will ignore it in his findings. From the point of view of appeals
trials by jury-are doubly objectionable. They result in the neces-
sity of technical rules of evidence at the trial. They clog not only
the trial courts but the appellate courts.9 They make review of
the facts upon appeal more difficult as a judge can make a statement
of his findings of fact while what the jury found is concealed within
05 R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process
(1932) 42 Yale I. J. 194, 204.
96 G. E. Osborne, Some Problems of Procedural Reform (1921) 7 A. B. A. J.
245, 249.
97 Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts (1930) 95. This is recommended
by the California Crime Commission, 1929 and the Illinois Crime Survey.
98 Judge Joseph N. Ulman points out that in a single criminlal case tried by
him he made 830 rulings on evidence, 615 being adverse to the defendant. A
Judge Takes the Stand (1933) 266.
99 In a survey of 8800 civil cases disposed of by the Superior Courts of Con-
necticut during 1925 and 1926, 26 per cent of jury cases and 8 per cent of court
cases were appealed. Leon Green, Judge and Jury (1930) 410. The Louisiana
Supreme Court is less strict on matters of evidence when trial is by the court.
Paul M. Hebert, The Problem of Rever~ible Error in Louisiana (1932) 6 Tul. L.
Rev. 169, 191; State v. Williams (1926) 160 La. 435, 107 So. 296.
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'the folds of a general verdict. The supremacy of the jury was long
used as an argument against letting the appellate court review the
facts.
In cases where a jury trial is had some relief against technicality
as to evidence may be obtained provided the appellate court assumes
the right attitude.100 In deciding whether a given rule should be
enforced or not the court should inquire into the need for so doing.
What end is to be served? More discretion might be given to the
trial courts in the application of the principles of evidence. Decisions
that the trial judge cannot comment on the evidence should be
reversed.
A recent New York study of civil appeals to the first depart-
ment of the appellate division in 1930 taken by the defendant against
money judgments secured against him indicates that a larger propor-
tion of court cases are reversed than are jury cases. 1 1 This, of
course, proves very little either as to the general run of civil cases
and even less as to criminal cases. Is it not likely that the more
difficult cases were tried by the -court? If the cases were more
difficult more reversals might be expected.
Prosecuting Attorney
Reversals can occur for no other reason than the mistakes
of the prosecuting attorney as the state cannot appeal from an
acquittal. It goes without saying then that improvement in the work
of the prosecuting attorney will mean fewer reversals.102 At present
he is usually elected and holds office but for a short term. He may
be over-anxious to secure convictions so as to make such a name
for himself to obtain a better office. The public has its eye on the
trial so that he can afford to risk the danger of an appeal. He may
be young and inexperienced with the result that he draws an indict-
ment improperly, or secures the admission of improper evidence, or
secures exclusion of proper evidence, or the giving of prejudicial in-
structions. He may fail to co-operate with the attorney general
when that official is charged with the duty of defending appeals."' 3
oo John W. Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions (1915) 9 Iln.
L. Rev. 529, 534.
101 Some Aspects of Appeals (1934), published by the New York Law Society,
p. 3. For a contrary result, see Charles E. Clark and Harry Shulman, Jury Trial
in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Administration (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 867, 882.
102 Numerous cases of reversal are discussed by William M. Cain, Sensational
Prosecutions and Reversals (1931) 7 Notre Dame Lawyer 1.
103 Report of the National Commission Law Observance and Enforcement on
Prosecution (1931) 10, 14. Until recently in Missouri a defendant convicted in
a trial court might get immunity by obtaining release on bail pending appeal
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The way out seems to be to require the selection of prosecuting
officials for long terms by the same authority which selects the
judges.10 All the reasons which demand the abolition of popular
election of judges do so in the case of prosecuting officials. Further-
more they should be made subject to central supervision. They
should be required to make reports to the attorney general."'
Partial relief may be secured if trial judges will promptly admonish
prosecutors guilty of misconduct.1
0 7
The Bar
Improvement in the character of the bar is also plainly
needed. 1 The appellate judges, the trial judges, and the prose-
cuting attorney all come from the bar. The attorneys who take
appeals also are members of the bar. An incompetent lawyer can
render but little assistance to the appellate court in deciding the
appeal. If the briefs and arguments of the lawyers stress technical
considerations the decision is likely to be permeated by them.' An
ignorant bar and an over-contentious bar will take exceptions to
rulings on evidence which would pass unnoticed in England. An
unethical lawyer will appeal merely for delay."0 On the other hand
where counsel is properly trained and has the proper professional
spirit he will present the case properly in both courts on the merits
with clarity and brevity. To secure such a bar the standards for
and the failing to prosecute the appeal. Then the appeal-having been taken,
local officers paid no further attention to the matter; and not being prosecuted
the appellate court knew nothing of the matter. Missouri Crime Survey (1926)
151, 358. M. C. Sloss, Reform of Criminal Procedure (19U) 1 J. of Crim. L. 705,
713. The state of the law as to the duties of the prosecuting attorney on appeal
is discussed in De Long and Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney, Powers and Duties
in Criminal Prosecution (1934) 24 J. of Crim. L. 1025, 1029.
104 Criminal Justice in Cleveland (1999) 139, 187, 687.
105 Bruce, The American Judge (1924) 87.
log De Long and Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney; Provisions of Law Organiz-
ing the Office (1933) 23 J. Crim. L. 926, 957; Earl H. De Long, Powers and Duties of
the State Attorney-General in Criminal Prosecutions (1934) 25 Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, 358, 372; W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Admin-
istration (1929) Chap. 11.
107 William M. Cain, Sensational Prosecutions and Reversals (1931) 7 Notre
Dame Lawyer 1, 2.
los For a good description of lawyers for the defense in practice, see John B.
Waite, Criminal Law in Action (1934) 171.
1o9 John W. Wigrore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions (1915) 9 Ill.
L. Rev. 529; RoscoeiPound, Criminal Justice in America (1929) 219; Roscoe Pound,
What Is a Good Lelal Education (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 627, 628.
11o These seem to be no cases where an attorney prosecuting a criminal appeal
was disbarred, suspended, fined, or more severely punished than being censored
by the court in delivering its opinion. (f929) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 70.
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admission to the bar must be elevated. Possibly it may be neces-
sary to limit the appellant to choice from a panel of lawyers. A
better type of lawyer for the defense would result in less temptation
to the prosecuting attorney to resort to wrong practices."'
The present mass of judicial decisions makes it hard even for
good lawyers to render the proper assistance to the appellate courts.
Is it any wonder that the amount of time that must be spent in
finding the law prevents the court from giving the careful thought
and deliberation necessary to secure a well-balanced decision? An
easy door is opened to going off on some technical ground rather
than on the merits. The combination of a welter of decisions with
congestion in the appellate court is bound to have its effect. It is
therefore imperative that for standards be so improved that* lawyers
who represent appellants be wise enough to know how to pick and
choose with nice discrimination. 1 2 Without such improvement the
victory is likely to go to those industrious lawyers who spend days
and nights seeking for a case on all fours with their own. A separate
appellate bar would improve matters but would be impractical in
democratic United States."'
The Law Schools
If it is true that appellate courts received inadequate as-
sistance from the lawyers it is equally true that they have received
until recent years almost no assistance from legal scholars." 4 The
leading treatise on Criminal Law in the United States, that by
Bishop, has remained practically unchanged for the past sixty years.
There is nothing in criminal law to correspond to Wigmore on Evi-
dence or Williston on Contracts. -It has been customary in many
American law schools to assign the subject of criminal law to the
most inexperienced professor. In only two or three law schools are
there professors who devote their whole time to the subject. Crim-
inal procedure is usually not taught in any but the larger schools;
and criminology is usually relegated to the sociology department of
the arts college.
The past decade or two has seen a change of attitude, however,
:11 Alexander A. Bruce, The American Judge (1924) 83.
112 John W. Davis, The Case for the Case Lawyer (1916) 41 A. B. A. Ky. 757;
(1917) 3 Mass. L. Quart. 99, 103.
113 Carter, Orrin N., C. J., Preparation and Presentation of Cases in Courts of
Review (1917) 12 111. L. Rev. 147, 159.
114 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America (1929) 210; Roscoe Pound, The
Future of the Criminal Law (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 15; Roscoe Pound, What Can
Law Schools Do for Criminal Justice? (1927) 12 Iowa L. Rev. 105.
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on the part of the law schools. The law schools have played the
leading part in the drafting by the American Law Institute of a
Code of Criminal Procedure. They will doubtless play a leading
part when the Institute takes up the restatement of the substantive
law of crime. The work of the National Commission on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement was substantially assisted by the law
schools. The Harvard University Law School has established an
Institute of Criminal Law and undertaken a comprehensive survey
of crime in Boston. The indications are that the law schools are
awaking to the importance of research in criminal law. The law
reviews are publishing articles of a more critical nature than was
earlier the case. 15
A Ministry of Justice
It is evident that the law schools and the bar can do much
to assist the appellate courts. But they alone cannot do everything.
The bar is busy with its private practice. It has little time to devote
to reforming the law. Its most successful practitioners are usually
the least interested in securing improvements since it is but human
to feel that a system under which one has attained success does not
need to be improved. Law teachers except in a few law schools
must devote most of their time to their classes. Some other agency
is therefore required."6 The judicial councils which have been
established in an increasing number of states during the past decade
help to meet the need." 7 In Europe there are ministries of justice.
The proper development of these organs can do much to relieve the
appellate court of all but the function of doing justice in particular
appeals. They could supervise the trial courts so that reversals
become less necessary. They could carry the burden of developing
the law.
A ministry of justice could do a great many things for the im-
provement of the administration of the criminal law. It could do
much to resolve the conflict of aims, attitudes and techniques which
now exist on every hand. It could promote co-ordination of effort
115 Unfortunately as Dean Wigmore has well pointed out. however, many
appellate judges fail to use the law reviews and prefer to cite hack writers.
The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions (1915) 9 111. L. Rev. 529.
11 Hessel E. Yntema, Legal Science and Reform (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 207,
221; Roscoe Pound, Juristic Problems of National Progress, 22 Am. J. of Soc. 721;
Roscoe Pound. Anachronisms in Law (1930) 3 3. Am. Jud. Soc. 143; Benjamin
Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice. 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113; Sheldon Glueck, The Ministry
of Justice and the Problem of Crime (1926) 4 Am. Rev. 139; Claud Mullins, In
ouest of Justice (1931) 149.
117 E. R. Sunderland. The Function and Organization of a Judicial Council
(1934) 9 Ind. L. Jour. 479.
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as well of aim between prosecutors, counsel, judges, clerks of court,
probation officers and other social workers. It could bring about a
scientific, systematized plan of record-keeping. It could study the
law in active rules and institutions which are antiquated might be
brought up to date. It should engage in scholarly research. It
should offer advice to the legislature. Starting out with the cor-
rection of the existing legal system it might later expand so as to
initiate more far-reaching reforms.
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